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Abstract 
This paper presents an economic model of group formation with an application to data 
collected from an agricultural credit program in western Honduras.  We formulate a 
simple theory of group formation using the concept of centers of gravity to explain why 
individuals join a group.  According to our theory, prospective members join based on the 
potential benefits and costs of group membership, and based on their perception of social 
distance between themselves and other group members.  Social distance is unobservable 
by outsiders but known by the individual: if you are in then you know who has blue hair.  
Thus, we argue that social distance helps explain preferences for group formation.  To 
test our theory we analyze data collected from members and non-members of PRODERT, 
a program that has helped create 188 “Cajas Rurales” (CRs).  Using conjoint analysis we 
test for differences in preferences between members and non-members for the main 
attributes of the CR.  We find that members and non-members exhibit similar preferences 
for the attributes of the CR; therefore non-membership is not related to supply factors.  
Using information gathered by executing field experiments, we estimate a proxy for 
social distance.  We use this proxy to run a group formation equation and find that it 
explains, along with individual characteristics, participation in the CR.  Finally we offer 
suggestions on how to balance performance and coverage in programs in which 
beneficiaries decide who joins.  Small cohesive groups may show exceptional 
performance at the cost of low coverage, and the opposite may be true.  
   3 
 
Introduction 
The majority of the 700,000 people that live in the Trifinio Region—an area that 
includes Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador—are poor and do not have access to 
opportunities that would allow them to climb out of poverty such as schools, health 
programs, an established infrastructure system, or an effective legal system.  The 
challenges of this region have been recognized by the national governments of the 
Trifinio and there is political will to address them.  As a result of this will, the Trifinio 
Commission was created in mid-1980s to coordinate efforts.  The barriers for the 
development of the region are formidable and according to the Trifinio Commission the 
key is to break the vicious cycle of poverty-environmental degradation that characterizes 
the socio-economic dynamic of this region.  Many projects in execution in the Trifinio 
address this issue; in this paper we focus on PRODERT Honduras, funded by Banco 
Centroamericano de Integración Económica (BCIE). 
The overall objective of PRODERT is to promote sustainable development of the 
Trifinio by improving living conditions.  More specifically, the project  aims at: (i) 
increasing productivity in agriculture and livestock activities, both for commercial 
production and own consumption; (ii) improving infrastructure to facilitate trade; and (iii) 
facilitating the creation of institutions that would, at the local level, make decisions about 
development  programs and provide services, including financing.   
PRODERT Honduras decided early on that successful implementation of such an 
ambitious program required the active participation and ownership of the project by its 
participants.  PRODERT packaged several components--financial and non-financial 4 
 
services such as agricultural extension and housing improvements--and began to deliver 
them to the poor through CR.  By law each CR is independent and fully owned by its 
members.  NGOs are the link between each CR and PRODERT, and provide the 
technical assistance that is at the core of this project.   
With limited resources PRODERT decided to prioritize poor rural communities 
that did not have support from other development programs.  Initially PRODERT 
approached municipal Mayors to identify communities in most need.  With the Mayor’s 
sponsorship PRODERT visited communities and conveyed a meeting to explain the 
project.  As a result of these meetings CR were created, with participation being 
voluntary.  As of April 2008 PRODERT has facilitated the creation of 188 CR that serve 
over 3,850 families. In general CR are successful and are capitalizing rapidly. CR boast 
perfect debt service performance as measured by arrears.  The program, however, also 
exhibits low coverage because on average membership includes only 30% of households 
in each community.   
Perfect performance combined with low coverage suggests that there is room to 
increase coverage by balancing these competing objectives.  PRODERT involved 
prospective beneficiaries from the beginning, and delegated execution to “them.” But 
who are “they”?  We argue that the proper definition of “them” is complicated and goes 
beyond the identification of the target population by observable selection criteria such as 
income or education.  We argue that this identification strategy is incomplete for 
programs that require beneficiaries to cooperate and for outcomes that depend on 
cooperation.  We hypothesize that allowing for self selection in group formation means 5 
 
members that join expect positive net benefits from joining and exhibit short social 
distances between each other: the blue hair effect.  Social distance is unobservable by 
outsiders but observable to the individual: if you are in then you know who has blue hair.  
Thus, we argue that social distance helps explain preferences for group formation. 
This paper presents and tests an economic theory of group formation. The rest of 
the paper includes a brief section on relevant literature that analyzes group formation, 
social distance, and conjoint analysis.  Then we present our theory of group formation 
using social distance in a centers of gravity inspired model.  Our research hypotheses and 
data collection and hypotheses testing strategy is followed by a description of our data 
and the main results of this paper, which then are summarized in the last section 
presenting our recommendations for the design and implementation of development 
programs that target poor rural farmers in Latin America.   
Relevant literature 
The question of group formation entered the lexicon of development economics in the 
middle of the last century with Mancur Olson’s Logic of Collective Action, 1965.  Since 
that time the issue has branched off into directions such as the microcredit area with 
detailed discussions of the experiences of the Grameen Bank (Stiglitz 1990).  Multilateral 
development organizations have increased their emphasis on group formation as 
government planned and implemented programs have failed to provide the intended 
economic boost.  That is, there has been a marked increase in the use of the terms like 
“participatory development” and “people-centered development,” which refer to 6 
 
grassroots, decentralized development.  This framework of development stresses the 
participation of the people in the formulation of development policy.  
Consider the following quote from James Wolfensohn, former World Bank President: 
The lesson is clear: for economic advance, you need social advance, and 
without social development, economic development cannot take root. … this 
means that we need to make sure that the programs and projects we support 
have adequate social foundations, 
• by learning more about how the changing dynamics between public 
institutions, markets, and civil society affect social and economic 
development. 
James Wolfensohn, speech at 1996 Annual Meetings.“New Paradigm” in 
Summary Proceedings, 1996. P. 28. 
And, in fact, there has been a clear push to broaden the community-driven 
component of World Bank projects over the past 20 years—from 2% in 1989 to 25% in 
2003 (WB2005).  Unfortunately, recent studies have shown that encouraging local 
communities to organize into groups that then have significant input into development 
programs does not necessarily guarantee the success of the program for the community as 
a whole.  Frequently the “lead” group benefits while other members in the community 
remain the same or end up even worse off (Walzer 2002).  Moreover, there is evidence 
that the more disadvantaged the individual, the less likely that person is to be a member 
of a civic group.  The causality (whether lack of participation limits progress or whether 
lack of development prevents group entry) is not clear (Banfield 1958, Glaeser, Ponzetto, 
and Schleifer 2006) but we do see that simply encouraging poor rural communities to 7 
 
form groups is not enough to ensure that those communities will experience an across-
the-board improvement in living conditions. 
What then can be done to broaden the impact of these rural community 
development programs?  Clearly the first step is to understand the dynamics of group 
formation.  This is particularly important when the program requires the participants 
work together for the duration of the project implementation, not simply in the design and 
conception phase.  For example, Gugerty and Kremer (2006) found that as younger, 
better-educated people joined the group, the disadvantaged members tended to exit.  
Moreover, it was the new entrants, either male or educated female, who assumed key 
leadership positions.  In their study there was a two-thirds increase in the exit rate of 
older women, the most disadvantaged demographic group, and a doubling of the rate at 
which members left groups due to conflict.  
Another way to describe the factors that can bring a group together (or force one 
apart) is the “social distance” between the members.  Striking the right balance in the 
selection of program participants is conceptually appealing, but not easy to implement in 
practice. The proper combination of attributes is crucial, and some of the traits may not 
be readily observed by outsiders—although community members are likely to know 
(Feder and Savastano 2006).  
There is some evidence that microcredit institutions with outstanding repayment 
records owe these rates to their small size and the effect of peer pressure that result from 
it (Stiglitz 1990).  In the case of PRODERT, however, the loans are individual rather than 
group based so this effect should largely be mitigated.  The conclusion we test is that the 8 
 
CR will not expand beyond their current sizes due to the costs of entry related to social 
distance rather than to a desire to remain small.  We look to conjoint analysis to 
demonstrate that no other difference is preferences can explain the barrier to entry.  
Conjoint analysis (CA) is commonly used in commercial marketing studies and 
analysis of consumers’ preferences.  It evaluates consumer response to program attributes 
when they are considered jointly.  We use conjoint analysis to determine if there are 
preference differences between members and non-members of the CRs.  If so, these 
differences might explain why the percentage of the community membership is not 
higher. If there is no significant difference in preferences then another explanation (such 
as social distance) must apply.  
Dufhues, Heidhues, and Buchenreider (2004) conducted a similar test using the 
same methods but we are working toward a different goal.  We are measuring the 
relevance of social distance in community members’ decisions to join the CR while they 
are looking at ways to modify existing programs.  The practical implications that are the 
foundation of our paper imply that the perfect rural finance program might not appeal to 
those community members that are not within the “gravity circle” of the existing 
members.  To provide a framework to analyze this issue we propose a theory of group 
formation. 
Theory of group formation 
We formulate a simple theory of group formation using the concept of centers of 
gravity to explain why individuals join a group. According to our theory, prospective 
members join based on the potential benefits and costs of group membership, and based 9 
 
on their perception of social distance between themselves and other group members. 
Social distance is unobservable by outsiders but observable to the individual: if you are in 
then you know who has blue hair. Thus, we argue that social distance helps explain 
preferences for group formation.   
We use the concept of social distance to account for the effect of “others” on the 
individual’s decision to join a group.  We modified the definition of social distance of 
Hoffman, McCabe, Smith (1996) to read “the degree of reciprocity that subjects believe 
exist within social space.”  Hoffman et al uses “the degree of reciprocity that subjects 
believe exist within a social interaction.”  The modification is important because in the 
context of group formation social distance does not depend on the particular social 
interaction but social distance is inherited.  People in social space interact with each other 
and have definite perceptions about the degree of reciprocity between them.  This 
variation, in line with Akerlof (1997), implies that at any point in time there will be a 
completely-defined set of social distances from any individual to the rest of people in the 
community.     
We use this initial set of social distances in social space to help explain group 
formation.  When a promoter attempts to form a group then she presents the group’s 
purpose, objectives and characteristics to each individual who is invited to join.  The 
purpose, objectives and characteristics of the group are bundled in package x that is 
defined by the attributes of the group.  For example the attributes for the CR include 
access to loans, extension services, and training; and obligations to contribute fees, save, 
and participate in meetings.  Each individual then analyses the costs and utility derived 10 
 
from x in the context of the inherited set of social distance between the prospective 
member and the promoters.   
It is important to emphasize that x plays a central role in our theory of the impact 
of social distance on group formation.  For example when the cost-related attributes of x 
are relaxed to x’, so that benefits increase with respect to costs, then additional 
prospective members that with x had barely negative net benefits may now with x’ have 
barely positive benefits, enough for some to join the group with the new attributes.  In 
this example the social distance of the new group members, that would join now with x’ 
but not with x, with respect to the promoters did not change because the attributes of x 
changed.  In other words the composition of the group is a consequence of the attributes 
of x and x’.   
We now formalize our theory of group formation.  When an individual i is invited 
to join a new group, her decision is influenced by her perceived benefits from joining the 
group ￿￿￿￿￿, inherited social distance to the center of gravity of the group promoters 
(￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿, and perception of the costs of membership, ￿￿￿￿￿. Such as Akerlof (1997) we 
use the concept of gravitational pull to derive the functional form of the net benefits of 
joining the group as directly proportional to the benefits of joining, and inversely 
proportional to the square of the social distance to the center of gravity of group 
promoters.  The prospective member utility function of joining the group with bundled x 
attributes is ￿ ￿￿￿￿: 
 
￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ 
￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿  (1) 11 
 
Where: 
￿ represents the bundled attributes of the group 
￿￿￿￿￿ is the utility function of individual i of joining group defined by attributes x 
￿￿￿￿￿ is the expected benefit to individual i of joining the group defined by attributes x 
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ is the square of the social distance of individual i with respect to the center of 
gravity of the promoters 
￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ is the formula for the pull force of gravity: the bigger the expected returns the 
stronger the force is, the longer the social distance the weaker the pull force is to 
individual i 
￿￿￿￿￿ is i’s perceived costs of joining the group  
In this context for a group with attributes x individual i will join and j will not join 
when:   
  ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ 0; ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ 0  (2) 
that may happen because: 
  ￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿,￿￿￿￿￿   !￿ ￿ "#   ￿￿$ ￿ ￿ %￿ ￿ ￿￿& ￿ ￿ %￿  (3) 
This is the main result of our theory because we derive a condition for social 
distance that is “sufficient” for joining a group given benefits and costs of group 
membership.  According to our theory members will join when their social distance to the 
core of the group is small and when the benefits of joining are high compared to the 
costs.  Note that the first part of equation (3) is referring to differences in utility streams.  
More people will join when the bundled x changes in a way that either benefits 
increase—such as offering new non-financial services—or costs decrease—such as 12 
 
reducing membership fees.  Using another example additional supply of loans under 
current lending terms will not increase membership, however changing lending terms 
might.  The intuition is straightforward, and is summarized Table 1. 
Group formation hypotheses, data collection and testing strategy 
Hypothesis 1: supply-side of group formation: community members have similar 
preferences for the attributes of the CR 
Hypothesis 2: demand side of group formation: using lab field experiments we 
elicit a proxy for social distance and test for group formation  
To test these 2 hypotheses we collected primary data.  With PRODERT we 
defined selection criteria for 5 CR in the municipalities of Concepcion and San Agustin, 
Honduras.  These 2 municipalities share the main characteristics of the target population 
of PRODERT: most of the households are poor rural farmers living in relatively isolated 
communities.  In these 2 municipalities we selected 5 communities using the following 
criteria: (i) communities of less than 200 households; (ii) agriculture is the primary 
activity; (iii) the CR was the only microcredit institution in the community; and (iv) 
PRODERT has a map of the community.  The selected communities were: Granadillal 
and Descansaderos in San Agustin, and Las Pavas, Delicias and La Cueva in Concepcion.  
Next we contacted community leaders and presented a letter of introduction that 
explained the purpose of the research and requested permission to organize a day-long 
event in the community.  We explained that in each community we would invite 30 
people, 15 members of the CR and 15 non-members, all randomly selected.  We also 
explained that their time will be compensated at about the rate of a daily wage—real 13 
 
compensation was related to the results of the field experiments and on average payments 
were close to the daily wage during coffee harvesting season, roughly US$4-6.  During 
each event we conducted a short survey to collect data on characteristics of participants 
and their households; then we executed choice experiments to collect data for conjoint 
analysis; finally we executed dictator and trust games.  This process was cleared by the 
Internal Review Board at Virginia Tech and field work started in March 7
th 2008 and and 
ended in March 16
th 2008.  In total we have data for 136 people.   
To test the first hypothesis we designed a choice experiment in which we 
approximated the characteristics of a microcredit institution with 4 attributes: (i) variable 
MEET=1 if members have to participate in periodic meetings to discuss CR management 
issues, MEET=0 otherwise; (ii) variable NONFIN=1 if members receive free non-
financial services, NONFIN=0 otherwise; (iii) variable COLL=1if loans require 
collateral, COLL=0 otherwise; and (iv) variable SAVE=1 if members have to save and 
make contributions to the institution, SAVE=0 otherwise.  Note that we did not include 
interest rates because interest rates are linked to collateral and, therefore, the two 
variables are not independent.  Including interest rates will violate, by design, the IIA 
condition necessary to estimate a conditional and mixed logit.  Figure 1 shows an 
example of the graphic representation of the attributes of each microcredit institution.  
We presented the choice experiments in graphic format to ensure that illiterate 
participants would be able to make informed decisions about their choices.  We also 
decided to keep the number of choice sets and alternatives to a minimum; therefore we 
selected an orthogonal design from the full factorial that would allow for estimation of 14 
 
main effects by asking individuals to select from 4 choice sets, each one with only 2 
alternatives.  Table 2 presents the orthogonal array—note that Figure 1 is the first choice 
set of the orthogonal array.  The null hypothesis that we are testing is H0: (βmembers)= (βnon-
members) where the βs represent the estimates of the conditional logit using data for 
members and non-members. 
To test the second hypothesis we used our theory of group formation but to avoid 
endogeneity issues related to the previous existence of the CR in all communities—that is 
we cannot separate individual responses as related to forming a group and their 
interactions since the group was formed—we applied cluster analysis using education and 
income/assets characteristics of the individual and defined 2 groups of people within the 
community.  Education and income/assets have been used in the past as key determinants 
of household livelihood strategies in Central America (Siegel & Alwang 1999 for the 
theory; and for practical applications Pichon et al 2006, Pichon, Alwang & Siegel 2006, 
Jansen, Siegel & Alwang 2005).   
We need one more step before we test our second hypothesis: we need to estimate 
a proxy for social distance.  For this purpose we use the results of the Dictator Game 
(DG) lab field experiments—see Annex I for a description of the DG protocol—
combined with the information we collected in the household survey about the observable 
characteristics of individuals.  Note that we executed plain vanilla DG—one person (call 
her the dictator) receives an endowment M and is faced with the decision of how to split 
the endowment between herself and an unknown second person—and one-on-one DG—
the dictator knows the identity of the second person, while at the same time preserving 15 
 
the anonymity of the dictator.  Because we executed one-on-one DG we have information 
on what everybody in each CR sent to everyone else, we call this a DG full mapping.  
The DG provides measures of an individual’s altruism, and we propose that it has three 
components: (i) an indicator of “general” altruism which we link to the DG played with 
an anonymous member of the community, the plain vanilla DG; (ii) an indicator of the 
dictator’s altruism as relates to the observable characteristics of the receiving individual 
in the full mapping DG exercise; and (iii) an indicator of the dictator’s altruism as relates 
to the unobservable characteristics of the receiving individual in the full mapping DG 
exercise.  Because we have the plain vanilla DG and the one-on-one DG, then we assume 
that everything that is not included in (i) and (ii) is in (iii).  We propose that the last 
component has information about how the dictator feels about the other person and is a 
proxy for the degree of reciprocity that subjects believe exist within social space, that is 
our proxy for social distance.  This last component, (iii), includes a variety of non 
observable characteristics such as family history, friendship, antipathy, past history, 
expectations about the future and perhaps many others that we bundle together and use as 
a proxy for social distance.   
Following the previous argument and given the information we collected in the 
field, we estimate a proxy for social distance using the following procedure.  Let DGij 
represent the amount that individual i sent to subject j in the DG.  Then (DGij-DGiA) 
reflects the amount that i would have sent to j in addition to what i would have sent to A, 
an anonymous subject that is the plain vanilla DG, and this relates to our component (i) 16 
 
explained in the previous paragraph.  To identify components (ii)  and (iii) from the 
previous paragraph we run the following OLS regression on all subjects: 
  ￿'(￿￿ ￿ '(￿)￿ ￿ *+ ￿,- ￿ . ￿￿￿  (4) 
Where: 
/0 is a vector of observable characteristics of individual j’s  
￿￿0 is the OLS residual and is our measure of social distance from individual i to 
individual j not due to observable factors 
The next step is to test our theory of group formation presented theoretically in 
equation (1) and in reduced form in equation (5).    
  1￿2 ￿ 34 . 35￿￿￿ . 36 %%% ￿′ ￿￿ . 7￿  (5) 
Where: 
8￿9 is 1 if individual i belongs to group 1as defined by results of cluster analysis, 0 
otherwise 
￿￿0 is our measure of social distance estimated from equation (4) for individual i with 
respect to individual j for all individuals j that share subject i’s status belonging to group 
G as defined by the results of the cluster analysis  
￿:
+ ￿ is a vector of observable characteristics of the individual i, note that proxys for 
benefits of joining the group are embedded in this component of the logistic regression—





Characteristics of participants 
  Before we show our main results we briefly present the summary statistics of the 
individuals who participated in the 5 events.  In total 136 people, 72 member and 64 non-
members of the CR.  The vast majority of participants, 106, were male.  Only 93 were 
literate, and only 1 person was not able to answer the choice questions.  Despite the large 
amount of illiterate participants, many that answered that they could not read were 
capable of recognizing numbers, so the quality of the DG data collected was not affected.  
Table 3 presents the characteristics of members and non-members, and also of the groups 
resulting from the cluster analysis. 
  In general CR members tend to be older, have larger families, have more 
education and own more land than non-members.  An interesting characteristic of our 
data is that there are no significant differences between members and non-members in the 
production of the 3 most important agricultural products of the region: coffee, maize and 
beans.  Because we use education and income to process our cluster analysis, the groups 
defined by the cluster analysis show sharper differences than those between CR members 
and non-members.  The main difference between CR membership and the results of the 
cluster analysis is the sharper difference in terms of average number of members, 
education, and size of land holdings, all of which are expected by the design of the 
analysis.  It is interesting to note that group 2 of the cluster analysis includes less 
educated and wealthy households, yet this group produces more maize and beans than 
wealthier households included in group 1; the opposite is true for coffee.  An explanation 
may be that the poorest households grow maize and beans for own consumption on land 18 
 
that is less expensive, whereas wealthier households concentrate on coffee, which is more 
profitable but requires more expensive land and the capacity of producers to finance their 
expenses most of the year given that coffee is harvested only once a year.   
  Finally, members of group 1 are more likely to be members of the CR: 62% of 
individuals in group 1 are also members of the CR compared to 37% in group 2.   
Main results of testing H0: (βmembers)= (βnon-members)--similar preferences for CR 
attributes 
  Table 4 shows the results of estimating, using conditional logit, the main effects 
of the impact of each one of the attributes—MEET, NONFIN, COLL, AND SAVE—for 
the following 5 groups: (i) the full sample; (ii) CR members; (iii) CR non-members; (iv) 
group 1 of the cluster analysis; (v) group 2 of the cluster analysis.  Table 5 shows the 
probability of choosing an alternative for each of the choice sets of our choice 
experiment—design of the orthogonal array and estimation of parameters using 
conditional and mixed logit rely heavily on SAS marketing macros and algorithms 
presented in Kuhfeld 2005
1
  All the estimates from the full sample have the expected sign, but only 2 are 
significant at 5%: MEET and NONFIN.  As expected the provision of non-financial 
services is an asset of the program and is reflected in our results.  These non-financial 
services include agricultural technical assistance in integrated pest management, 
composting techniques, and the introduction of new crops such as cabbage.  Technical 
assistance goes beyond and also includes house improvements, education and increasing 
self esteem.  These results show that since the creation of CR in each community all have 19 
 
come to value the supply of non-financial services.  The same conclusion may be reached 
when analyzing the significance and strength of MEET.  Periodical meetings are 
perceived as positive and constructive as they build social capital in the community.  
These 2 findings are relevant and point to the need to define programs that have multiple 
objectives.  In this case the CR is not just about lending and borrowing. 
  The comparison between the estimates of members and non-members conveys 4 
messages.  First, obligatory meetings are significant and their estimate is larger for 
members than for non-members.  Second non-financial services are significant for both 
groups, however members value them more.  Third, both samples would prefer to borrow 
without pledging collateral, although the estimates are not significant for either group.  
Fourth, there is sharp contrast between the preferences for saving: members want to save, 
non-members do not want to save; however this result is inconclusive because these 
estimates are not statistically significant.  These results show some differences between 
the preferences for members and non-members, however we cannot draw from these 
results any conclusion about group formation because we executed choice experiments 
when the CR had been formed and working for 2-3 years.  Using Chow test we tested the 
hypothesis that the estimates are the same.  Our test statistic is 9.1057 and the p-value for 
a χ
2 distribution with 4 degrees of freedom is 0.0585 therefore we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of equal estimates for members and non-members at 5%.  We will see that 
when we use clusters instead of CR membership the test statistic provides much clearer 
and conclusive results.    20 
 
  When grouping individuals by the results of the cluster analysis we find that 
members of group 2, those with less education, income and assets, have a strong 
preference against pledging their fixed assets as collateral when borrowing.  This group 
also exhibits strong preferences for non-financial services.  This result shows that in the 
case of CR, that require collateral and also provide non-financial services, individuals 
that have less education and income struggle as they decide to join the CR: on one hand 
they recognize the value of technical assistance—in fact they value it more than members 
of group 2 that have more education and income, on the other hand they do not want to 
borrow if they have to pledge their land.  This result may indicate that there is room for 
increasing coverage if this issue is properly addressed, maybe by the inclusion of group 
lending as an alternative.  Finally, the Chow test of the hypothesis that the estimates are 
the same, our test statistic is 11.826 and the p-value for a χ
2 distribution with 4 degrees of 
freedom is 0.568 therefore we cannot reject, with confidence!, the null hypothesis of 
equal estimates for members and non-members at 5%.  Note the difference compared to 
the same test using CR membership.  This result is interesting because one would expect 
that people that share more observable characteristics would also have similar 
preferences.  Therefore the sharper contrasts in wealth and education would result in 
sharper differences in preferences.  This is not the case.  In our opinion this result 
validates the selection of education and income as key determinants for defining 
homogeneous groups using cluster analysis.  Although this is only an incomplete story 
that lacks the wealth of information that can be collected, as we will show later, from 
unobservable characteristics of individuals, the message that it sends is strong: education 21 
 
and income can be powerful indicators to identify people with similar preferences in rural 
Honduras. 
  We then added 3 variables to the analysis: PCTLIT, the percentage of household 
members that are literate, AVGINCOME, total income divided by total number of 
household members, and HHLANDSIZE, the size of landholdings of the household.  We 
interacted these 3 variables with all the attributes of the microcredit institution and using 
a mixed logit we derived estimates that are presented in Table 6.  Table 7 shows the 
probability of choosing an alternative for each of the choice sets of our choice experiment 
now that we are also estimating the interactions.   
  The additional information provides some interesting insights into the differences 
between the groups.  First, we confirm that education helps explain preferences for 
attending meetings but not for all, only for those groups that are characterized by being 
less educated and have less income and assets--note that the estimates for MEET change 
sign and become not significant.  Second we confirm that collateral, especially for less 
educated and poor people, is an important deterrent to CR participation.  Note that the 
estimate for collateral in cluster group 2 decreases to -0.72 from -.046.   
Main results of testing for effect of social distance on group formation 
  Using equation (4) we created 3 versions of our proxy for social distance.  First 
we ran equation (4) once for the full dataset and saved the residuals to use as our first 
proxy for social distance and called it SOCDISALL, Table 8 presents the results of this 
OLS regression.  Second, we ran equation (4) 5 times, one per CR, and saved the 
residuals as another proxy for social distance and called it SOCDISCR.  Third, we ran 22 
 
equation (4) 136 times and saved the residuals as SOCDIS136.  We will use these 3 
proxy measures for social distance in our estimation of the group formation equation (5). 
  We now estimate equation (5) using a logistic regression on our 3 measures of 
social distance and for the individuals grouped by the result of the cluster analysis.  Table 
9 shows the results using SOCDISALL, Table 10 with SOCDISCR, and Table 11 with 
SOCDIS136.  Note that our 3 estimates of social distance are statistically significant and 
positive.  Also notice that we chose to report the odds ratio and not the beta estimate.  
Although the results are the same, we prefer this presentation because we present the 
impact on group membership by changing 1 unit of the independent variable,with 
intuition comparable to the elasticity concept.  Finally we will present our results 
focusing on Table 11 that uses SOCDIS136.  We do it for theoretical reasons: this 
estimate is the one that reflects how much each individual decided to send to every other 
individual participating in her meeting.  As such this measure is “pure” from the point of 
view of zero noise and avoiding the possibility that errors may be correlated within CR or 
by CR.  It is rewarding to report that this is the regression that offers the best fit—Pseudo 
R
2=0.7 compared against 0.6 for both alternative measures of social distance 
SOCDISALL and SOCDISCR.  The analysis in the following paragraphs of this section 
refers to Table 11. 
  First: social distance matters for group formation. A key consideration for group 
formation, in the context of bottom-up development programs, is to attempt to understand 
the complex unobservable relationships that exist between people in communities.  Free 
from endogeneity issues, because our groups are based on cluster analysis, our results 23 
 
show that the probability of membership increases when people are close.  It is tempting 
to run a regression of social distance on observable variables, however, this will be 
misleading.  Development practitioners have to make difficult decisions when designing 
programs: either they prioritize strong social ties within the program, or they prioritize 
program coverage.  It may be the case, particularly in poor rural communities, that 
practitioners cannot accomplish both objectives jointly because social distance “is” and is 
inherited.   
Second: it is easy to be misled by partial results.  There are only 3 variables in 
addition to social distance that point to increased inclusion: (i) households that have 
horses; (ii) and (iii) households that grow beans and maize.  Only the rich own a truck or 
a car in rural western Honduras, however owning a horse reflects status and this may be 
the reason why this dummy variable is so relevant for group formation.  Additional 
research may go into this arena, for this paper, however, we hypothesize that this finding 
is consistent with our previous findings of the impact of education and income.  A simple 
status symbol, such as owning a horse, may reflect non-observable relevant 
characteristics of individuals that merit attention by development practitioners.  Beans 
and maize are a puzzle because we concluded previously that maize and bean producers 
were producing for self-consumption, and are over-represented in cluster group 2.  
Because group 2 has less people belonging to CR than group 1 and therefore are less 
educated and wealthy than group 1 people, we can only suggest that those maize and 
bean producers in group 2 are members of the CR and are also big producers.  The 
message here to development practitioners is of caution about the observable 24 
 
characteristics of potential participants because without a deep understanding of the 
underlying foundations of group formation it is easy to be mislead by partial results.   
Third: it is easy to be misled by partial results … again.  Throughout this paper 
we have repeatedly emphasized the role of household education and income/assets in 
determining preferences and, implicitly, group formation.  Look again at Table 11.  
Gender, literacy, age, titling, and production diversification do not add much to group 
formation.  For this reason we emphasize again that unobservable variables are exactly 
unobservable.  We believe that proxy measures, such as those proposed by us in this 
paper, have the potential to help us understand the complex human interactions when 
deciding group membership.  
Concluding remarks and policy recommendations. 
We have attempted to solve the puzzle of group formation in the PRODERT 
program.  We show that differences in preferences for attributes of the program did not 
explain group formation, an expected result given that these communities are relatively 
homogenous.  A closer look at the individual characteristics of participants, grouped by 
CR membership and more by the results of the cluster analysis, shows significant 
differences in their education, income, assets, and other factors.  An even closer look at 
individuals shows that they differentiate between members of the community, and they 
send more money to the people they like more.  Using this information we find that social 
distance is central to explaining group formation in 5 communities in western Honduras.   25 
 
We believe that this program has many lessons to teach in terms of rural and 
regional development.  We now turn to some final suggestions for development 
practitioners. 
What can a development practitioner learn from this paper? 
First: it is not easy to find the balance between performance and coverage of 
financial institutions.  Effective programs require managing potential risks throughout the 
project cycle.  Excessive risk aversion on the part of CR may result in good performance 
at the cost of low coverage.  Beneficiaries self-selection may result in small strong groups 
if the attributes of the program, the x, require strong commitments.  Combining self-
selection and great commitment by beneficiaries may result in good programs that work 
but that exhibit low coverage.  Relaxing the demands imposed by program attributes may 
increase coverage, but will also lower the cohesiveness of the group.  Using what we 
learned from analyzing PRODERT, then we suggest that if they want to increase 
coverage then they may consider reviewing the lending terms offered by CR.  Our results 
show that the poorest of the poor do not like the idea of pledging collateral but recognize 
the benefits of non-financial services.  The introduction of lending terms that allow for 
collateral-free loans at higher interest rates may be an interesting option for CR.  
Conversely the inclusion of additional non-financial services may also induce people to 
join the CR.   
Second: eliciting preferences and proxy measures for social distance is not that 
difficult.  The identification of beneficiaries’ preferences for attributes of programs 
provides relevant information that could be used during the design process of 26 
 
development programs.  Our field work included the execution of a survey with choice 
experiments.  It took about 20-30 minutes to execute the survey and choice experiments, 
note that we were in the field, usually using a school for the meeting and that the 
participants had on average 1.8 years of education.  Eliciting information about social 
distance is significantly more difficult and the results are less useful for the design of 
programs.  It takes great care and attention to detail to execute lab field experiments.  We 
spent twice as much time executing dictator and trust games as we spent executing the 
survey.  Moreover, this activity cannot be delegated to trained teams given the 
complexity of the execution of this activity.  However, social distance can be extremely 
useful for the analysis of program results.  In our paper we use social distance to analyze 
group formation.  In a different context, for example trying to determine the underlying 
factors of failure/success of a program, social distance may provide key insights and add 
a metric to unobservable characteristics of beneficiaries.  In other words, our approach to 
elicit a proxy for social distance may be used in different contexts and may provide a 
measurable estimate being the alternative a subjective and non-testable approach to 
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Table 1: Main results from our condition of sufficient social distance 
Ceteris paribus: A 
change from x to x’ 
that 
Impact on social 
distance 
Explanation 
Increases benefits  None, but now 
people that were far 
will consider joining 
if V(x) is now ≥0  
For people that before were “too far” to 
join with x, now join with increased 
benefit related to x’  
Decreases costs  None, but now 
people that were far 
will consider joining 
if V(x) is now ≥0 
For people that before were “too far” to 
join with x, now join with decreased cost 
related to x’  
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Table 2: Choice experiments orthogonal array
MEET NONFINCOLL SAVE
ALT 1 -1 -1 -1 1
ALT 2 1 1 1 -1
ALT 1 1 1 -1 1
ALT 2 -1 -1 1 -1
ALT 1 -1 1 1 1
ALT 2 1 -1 -1 -1
ALT 1 1 -1 1 1
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Member Non-member G-1 G-2
Count 72 64 87 49
Gender, 1=Female 1.78 1.78 1.79 1.76
Head of HH literate, 1=Yes 1.26 1.38 1.15 1.61
Head of HH AGE 40.54 36.19 40.00 35.82
HH number of members 6.26 5.17 6.24 4.88
HH literate members, number 3.68 2.63 3.91 1.90
HH AGES (total years) 126.58 111.64 129.78 101.39
HH members years of ED (total years) 12.93 8.38 13.41 6.12
HH CHILDREN under 8 years 1.67 1.50 1.59 1.59
HH LANDSIZE 5.44 3.58 6.03 1.97
HH COFFEE production 18.13 16.92 23.76 6.55
HH MAIZE production 10.58 11.14 9.03 14.06
HH BEANS production 2.15 2.08 1.61 3.02
Table 3: Group characteristics, all averages except count
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Table 4: Results of estimating parameters of conjoint analysis, conditional logit 






MEET           
Estimate  .21934  .24393  .19413  .24041  0.18981       
Standard 
error 
.08893  .12360  .12984  .11024  0.15473        
Chi-Square  6.0828  3.8947  2.2355  4.7561  1.5050        
Pr>ChiSq  .0137  .0484  .1349  .0292  0.2199 
NONFIN           
Estimate  .44329  .52441  .35923  .40177  .54235 
Standard 
error 
.08893  .12360  .12984  .11024  .15473 
Chi-Square  24.8448  18.005  7.6553  13.2825  12.2868 
Pr>ChiSq  <.001  <.001  .0057  .0003  .0005 
COLLATERAL           
Estimate  -.12608  -.07204  -.19413  .04857  -.45839 
Standard 
error 
.08893  .12360  .12984  .11024  .15473 
Chi-Square  2.0099  .3397  2.2355  .1941  8.7768 
Pr>ChiSq  .1563  .56  .1349  .6595  .0031 
SAVE           
Estimate  .00593  .18547  -.19413  -.00228  .02247 
Standard 
error 
.08893  .12360  .12984  .11024  .15473 
Chi-Square  .0045  2.2516  2.2355  .0004  .0211 34 
 
Pr>ChiSq  .9468  .1335  .1349  .983535  .8846 
Note: Bold shaded indicates significant at 5%. 
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Table 5: PROBABILITY (%) OF CHOOSING AN ALTERNATIVE FROM A 
CHOICE SET 
 






CHOICE SET 1           
2-2-2-1  37.037  37.500  36.509  33.336  43.750 
1-1-1-2  62.963  62.500  63.491  66.664  56.250 
CHOICE SET 2           
1-1-2-1  68.883  73.611  63.491  64.367  77.083 
2-2-1-2  31.117  26.389  36.509  35.633  22.917 
CHOICE SET 3           
2-1-1-1  52.593  59.722  44.444  55.172  47.917 
1-2-2-2  47.407  40.278  55.556  44.828  52.083 
CHOICE SET 4           
1-2-1-1  41.482  45.833  36.509  47.126  31.250 
2-1-2-2  58.518  54.167  63.491  52.874  68.750 
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Table 6: Results of estimating parameters of conjoint analysis, mixed logit 






MEET           
Estimate  -.26940  -.01839  -.38022  -0.28017  -0.1985 
Standard error  .21952  .35441  .29837  0.35902  0.33615 
Chi-Square  1.5061  .0027  1.6239  0.609  0.3487 
Pr>ChiSq  .2197  .9586  .2026  0.4352  0.5549 
NONFIN           
Estimate  .23605  .26517  .30831  0.18727  0.02454 
Standard error  .21952  .35441  .29837  0.35902  0.33615 
Chi-Square  1.1563  .5598  1.0677  0.2721  0.0053 
Pr>ChiSq  .2822  .4543  .3015  0.6019  0.9418 
COLLATERAL           
Estimate  -.64641  -.84627  -.5406  -0.28828  -0.71977 
Standard error  .21952  .35441  .29837  0.35902  0.33615 
Chi-Square  8.6712  5.7019  3.2827  0.6448  4.5848 
Pr>ChiSq  .0032  .0169  .07  0.422  0.0323 
SAVE           
Estimate  -.00576  .20784  -.06425  0.03741  0.17835 
Standard error  .21952  .35441  .29837  0.35902  0.33615 
Chi-Square  .0007  .3439  .0464  0.0109  0.2815 
Pr>ChiSq  .9791  .5576  .8395  0.917  0.5957 37 
 
PCTLIT*MEET           
Estimate  .87390  .37678  1.18744  0.73204  2.04359 
Standard error  .38455  .61582  .52678  0.55708  0.77771 
Chi-Square  5.1644  .3743  5.0811  1.7268  6.9048 
Pr>ChiSq  .0231  .5406  .0242  0.1888  0.0086 
PCTLIT*NONFIN           
Estimate  .39327  .40623  .21736  0.34928  1.05867 
Standard error  .38455  .61582  .52678  0.55708  0.77771 
Chi-Square  1.0458  .4352  .1703  0.3931  1.853 
Pr>ChiSq  .3065  .5095  .6799  0.5307  0.1734 
PCTLIT*COLL           
Estimate  1.05578  1.19363  .96444  0.61779  0.85293 
Standard error  .38455  .61582  .52678  0.55708  0.77771 
Chi-Square  7.5378  3.7570  3.3518  1.2298  1.2028 
Pr>ChiSq  .0060  .0526  .0671  0.2674  0.2728 
PCTLIT*SAVE           
Estimate  .21816  -.05572  .14396  0.0725  1.1321 
Standard error  .38455  .61582  .52678  0.55708  0.77771 
Chi-Square  .3218  .0082  .0747  0.0169  2.119 
Pr>ChiSq  .5705  .9279  .7846  0.8965  0.1455 
AVGINCOME*MEET           
Estimate  .0000447  .0000101  .0001371  0.000095  -0.00069 
Standard error  .0001368  .0002334  .0002157  0.000143  0.000505 38 
 
Chi-Square  .1068  .0019  .4037  0.4398  1.8417 
Pr>ChiSq  .7438  .9654  .5252  0.5072  0.1747 
AVGINCOME 
*NONFIN 
     
   
Estimate  .0000555  .0000608  .0001118  3.64E-05  0.000386 
Standard error  .0001368  .0002334  .0002157  0.000143  0.000505 
Chi-Square  .1648  .0678  .2687  0.0645  0.5841 
Pr>ChiSq  .6848  .7946  .6042  0.7996  0.4447 
AVGINCOME *COLL           
Estimate  -.0000834  .0001719  -.0002968  -6.9E-05  -0.00036 
Standard error  .0001368  .0002334  .0002157  0.000143  0.000505 
Chi-Square  .3715  .542  1.8926  0.233  0.5187 
Pr>ChiSq  .5422  .4616  .1689  0.6293  0.4714 
AVGINCOME *SAVE           
Estimate  -.0001892  -.0000419  -.0002307  -0.00015  -0.00088 
Standard error  .0001368  .0002334  .0002157  0.000143  0.000505 
Chi-Square  1.9135  .0322  1.1436  1.1375  3.0302 
Pr>ChiSq  .1666  .8576  .2849  0.2862  0.0817 
HHLANDSIZE*MEET           
Estimate  -.0001376  .00929  -0.02824  0.000772  -0.0055 
Standard error  .0089  .01258  0.02509  0.00898  0.05188 
Chi-Square  .0002  .5448  1.267  0.0074  0.0112 




     
   
Estimate  -.00498  .00106  -0.0327  -0.00353  0.00652 
Standard error  .0089  .01258  0.02509  0.00898  0.05188 
Chi-Square  .3126  .0071  1.6986  0.1543  0.0158 
Pr>ChiSq  .5761  .9328  0.1925  0.6944  0.8999 
HHLANDSIZE 
*COLL 
     
   
Estimate  .00276  .0000435  0.0187  0.000777  0.03268 
Standard error  .0089  .01258  0.02509  0.00898  0.05188 
Chi-Square  .0958  .0071  0.5557  0.0075  0.3968 
Pr>ChiSq  .7569  .9328  0.456  0.9311  0.5287 
HHLANDSIZE *SAVE           
Estimate  -.0000311  .00555  -0.02365  0.00227  -0.07061 
Standard error  .0089  .01258  0.02509  0.00898  0.05188 
Chi-Square  0  .1946  0.8888  0.0641  1.8523 
Pr>ChiSq  .9972  .6591  0.3458  0.8001  0.1735 
Note: Bold shaded indicates significant at 5%. 
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Table 7: PROBABILITY (%) OF CHOOSING AN ALTERNATIVE FROM A 
CHOICE SET 








         
2-2-2-1  45.542  33.587  42.525  43.706  37.296 
1-1-1-2  54.458  66.413  57.475  56.294  62.704 
CHOICE 
SET 2 
         
1-1-2-1  67.847  70.663  61.569  60.986  86.093 
2-2-1-2  32.153  29.337  38.431  39.014  13.907 
CHOICE 
SET 3 
         
2-1-1-1  51.435  62.652  48.152  55.832  51.394 
1-2-2-2  48.565  37.348  51.848  44.168  48.606 
CHOICE 
SET 4 
         
1-2-1-1  35.983  45.239  33.533  41.278  29.145 
2-1-2-2  64.017  54.761  66.467  58.722  70.855 
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Table 8: OLS results of equation 4 on all the observations 
Number of 
obs     3449 
F( 10,  
3438)     32.24 
Prob > F     0 
R-squared     0.0857 
Adj R-
squared     0.0831 
Root MSE     35.624 
moneyclean  Coef.  Std. Err.  t  P>t  95% Conf. Interval 
hhhage  -0.14  0.05  -2.85  0.00  -0.23  -0.04 
dhhown  -7.04  2.21  -3.19  0.00  -11.37  -2.71 
dhhelec  -21.72  1.54  -14.08  0.00  -24.74  -18.69 
avgincome  0.00  0.00  -3.82  0.00  -0.01  0.00 
dhhlandown  4.60  1.86  2.47  0.01  0.95  8.25 
hhmaize  0.20  0.06  3.30  0.00  0.08  0.32 
hhbeans  -0.71  0.25  -2.89  0.00  -1.19  -0.23 
dhhhorse  -5.05  1.43  -3.52  0.00  -7.86  -2.24 
dhhyegua  4.98  1.90  2.62  0.01  1.25  8.71 
_cons  21.78  2.84  7.66  0.00  16.20  27.35 
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Table 9: Logistic results of equation 5 on all SOCDISALL 
 
Logistic regression  Number of obs  1896 
LR chi2(11)  1253.09 
Prob > chi2  0 
Log likelihood = -423.98549  Pseudo R2  0.5964 
CSen  Odds Ratio  Std. Err.  z  P>z  [95% Conf. Interval 
socdisALL  1.02  0.01  2.26  0.02  1.00  1.05 
dgender  0.31  0.08  -4.70  0.00  0.19  0.51 
dhhhlit  0.01  0.00  -15.84  0.00  0.00  0.01 
hhmem  0.53  0.03  -10.53  0.00  0.48  0.60 
dhhtitle  0.07  0.02  -11.50  0.00  0.05  0.11 
hhcoffee  0.92  0.01  -8.61  0.00  0.90  0.94 
hhmaize  1.06  0.01  5.66  0.00  1.04  1.08 
hhbeans  1.84  0.09  11.95  0.00  1.67  2.04 
ddiversified  0.43  0.11  -3.33  0.00  0.26  0.70 
dhhmulas  0.03  0.02  -7.30  0.00  0.01  0.08 
dhhyegua  0.15  0.05  -5.96  0.00  0.08  0.28 
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Table 10: Logistic results of equation 5 on all SOCDISCR 
 
Logistic regression  Number of obs  1896 
LR chi2(11)  1277.56 
Prob > chi2  0 
Log likelihood =  -411.7489  Pseudo R2  0.6081 
CSen 
Odds 
Ratio  Std. Err.  z  P>z 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
socdisCR  1.19  0.04  5.30  0.00  1.11  1.27 
dgender  0.42  0.10  -3.72  0.00  0.26  0.66 
dhhhlit  0.01  0.00  -16.28  0.00  0.00  0.01 
hhmem  0.53  0.03  -10.71  0.00  0.47  0.59 
dhhtitle  0.07  0.02  -11.57  0.00  0.04  0.11 
hhcoffee  0.92  0.01  -8.64  0.00  0.90  0.94 
hhmaize  1.06  0.01  5.23  0.00  1.03  1.08 
hhbeans  1.81  0.09  11.74  0.00  1.64  1.99 
ddiversified  0.44  0.11  -3.24  0.00  0.26  0.72 
dhhmulas  0.03  0.01  -7.63  0.00  0.01  0.07 
dhhyegua  0.15  0.05  -5.90  0.00  0.08  0.28 
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Table 11: Logistic results of equation 5 on all SOCDIS136 
Logistic regression  Number of obs  1896 
LR chi2(13)  1464.09 
Prob > chi2  0 
Log likelihood = -318.48424  Pseudo R2  0.6968 
CSen 
Odds 
Ratio  Std. Err.  z  P>z 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
socdis136  1.02  0.01  2.73  0.01  1.01  1.04 
dgender  0.28  0.07  -4.84  0.00  0.16  0.46 
dhhhlit  0.00  0.00  -12.56  0.00  0.00  0.01 
hhmem  0.45  0.04  -9.36  0.00  0.38  0.53 
hhavged  0.21  0.03  -10.95  0.00  0.16  0.27 
dhhhorse  3.53  1.30  3.44  0.00  1.72  7.25 
dhhtitle  0.09  0.02  -9.01  0.00  0.06  0.16 
hhcoffee  0.86  0.01  -8.97  0.00  0.83  0.89 
hhmaize  1.09  0.01  6.73  0.00  1.07  1.12 
hhbeans  2.26  0.16  11.15  0.00  1.96  2.60 
ddiversified  0.18  0.06  -4.88  0.00  0.09  0.36 
dhhmulas  0.01  0.01  -6.56  0.00  0.00  0.04 
dhhyegua  0.08  0.04  -5.07  0.00  0.03  0.21 




Figure 1: Choice set 1 of conjoint questions 
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Annex I—Dictator Game protocol 
The traditional dictator game 
To capture measures of altruism we employ the commonly play dictator game, 
which is a simple decision game void of strategic interaction.  In the decision game one 
person (call her the dictator) receives an endowment M and is faced with the decision of 
how to split the endowment between herself and a second person.  The money ‘sent’ to 
the second person is sometimes multiplied by some factor greater than one.  For example, 
in our experiment we multiply the amount the dictator sends to the second person by a 
factor of two.  The dictator’s identity is usually not observed by the second person so that 
the amount the dictator sends to the second person is considered a measure of altruism.  If 
the dictator does not know the identity of the second person then we consider the amount 
sent by the dictator to the second person as a measure of generic altruism.   
However, one may devise the experiment so that the dictator knows the identity of 
the second person, while at the same time preserving the anonymity of the dictator.  
When an anonymous dictator knows the identity of the second person, we consider the 
amount sent by the dictator to be a measure of directed altruism.  If we assume social 
preferences over the second person’s monetary payout (rather than the second person’s 
utility) then directed altruism may be considered a measure of social distance.  This 
interpretation relies on the intuitive notion that the closer I am to you socially, then the 
more weight I put on your monetary payout in my utility function.  Having said that, if 
social preferences are over others’ utilities then directed altruism is a combination of 
social distance and the dictator’s distributional preferences.  That is, assuming social 47 
 
preferences over others’ utilities rather than others’ monetary payouts recognizes the fact 
that I may be socially closer to my wealthy brother than a homeless person, but I may, in 
fact, give more to a homeless person than my wealthy brother.    
Description of dictator game protocol 
Detailed oral instructions were provided at the beginning of the experiment 
session.  We also developed several examples of how to play the game.  We explained 
the directed dictator game first (the dictator game in which the identity of the second 
person was revealed to the dictator).  Once everyone understood the game we randomly 
assigned each person to a seat so that a large circle was formed.  In order to maintain the 
privacy of decision-making throughout the experiment, each person was given a privacy 
box that sat on their lap.  Next we picked a random person’s name from the circle and 
asked them to go to the center of the circle.  Those participants remaining in their seats 
each played the role of the dictator in the dictator game while the person in the center 
played the role of the “second person” in the dictator game.  Everyone except the person 
in the center of the circle was given an empty envelope and a ticket (see ticket below) 
with their personal identification code on the back of the ticket.  We asked each person to 
mark an ‘X’ in the row corresponding to their own desires for distributing money 
between them and the second person in the center of the room.  Once each person made 
their decision, they were instructed to put their ticket in the envelope and place the 
envelope on top of their privacy box.  We explicitly reminded them to mark an ‘X’ in 
only one row on the ticket.  Next someone collected the envelopes and mixed the 
envelopes in random order.  The envelopes were put in a bag and mixed again, and then 48 
 
the “second person” in the center of the room randomly picked one of the envelopes.  
This randomly selected envelope went into the center person’s yellow compensation 
folder. The person in the center was reminded that at the end of the day that their yellow 
compensation folder would have six such envelopes.  Each person would randomly pick 
one of the six envelopes from their yellow compensation envelope and this would be their 
compensation for the day.  Next, the person in the center of the room returned to their 
seat and a new person from the circle was randomly called to the center.  We repeated 
this process until everyone had passed to the center of the circle.  In this way we were 
able to obtain a full mapping of directed altruism measures between all participants in the 
experiment.  That is, for each individual i in the experiment we were able to obtain a 
measure of directed altruism towards each participant j (j not equal to i) in the 
experiment.   
After this directed dictator game was completed we had the participants play a 
generic dictator game.  In this version no one passed to the center of the circle.  This 
signified that as dictator they would not know the identity of the second person in the 
dictator game (the person with whom they were splitting the money).  That is, each 
person would make a decision and then we would randomly assign the envelopes to a 
second person, and these envelopes would go in each second person’s yellow [prize] 
folder.  In this way we were able to obtain a measure of generic altruism. 
Next we played two final rounds of generic dictator games, each with a slight 
variation.  In one dictator game we informed the participants that they would play a 
generic dictator game where they knew the second person was a member of the CR.  That 49 
 
is, after everyone made their decision as dictator, we mixed up the envelopes, put them in 
a bag and then had each participant who was a member of the caja rural randomly select 
an envelope.  When they selected their envelope they put it in their yellow compensation 
folder.  In this way we were able to obtain measures of generic altruism towards members 
of the CR.   
In the final generic dictator game we informed the participants that they would 
play a generic dictator game where they knew the second person was a not a member of 
the CR.  That is, after everyone made their decision as dictator, we mixed up the 
envelopes, put them in a bag and then had each participant who was not a member of the 
caja rural randomly select an envelope.  When they selected their envelope they put it in 
their yellow compensation folder.  In this way we were able to obtain measures of generic 
altruism towards non-members of the caja rural.   
To summarize, the experiments we used allowed us to collect four measures of 
altruism for each individual: 1) a measure of directed altruism towards a specific 
individual; 2) a measure of generic altruism towards community members; 3) a measure 
of generic altruism towards community members in the CR; and 4) a measure of generic 
altruism towards community members not in the CR. 
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1 This is the only endnote in this paper and is intended to reflect our deep appreciation for 
Warren Kuhfeld of SAS Institute.  During the design process of the conjoint choice sets 
we ran into some issues: we wanted a small yet main effects design that would minimize 
the number of choice sets and alternatives within sets.  Being stuck, we sent an email to 
Dr. Kuhfeld, someone that we have not met in person nor, until that point, had we 
exchanged any correspondence.  He responded with a complete answer within minutes, 
including suggestions to improve the design.  Such disinterested commitment to science 
is remarkable and we use this unique footnote to thank him for his support.  We hope 
students and practitioners read papers thoroughly, footnotes included.  All errors in the 
paper are, as they should be, ours.   